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NOTES AND COMMENTS
SOME ASPECTS OF THE TRUST INDENTURE ACT OF

1939

Duties and Responsibilities of Indenture Trustees
Introductory
By the Trust Indenture Act of 19391 Congress took another step in
providing for protection of security investors, in addition to those already
taken by means of the Securities Act of 1933,2 which required disclosure
through registration statements of fact data material to prospective
investors regarding the financial condition of the issuer of securities,
and by means of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,3 which regulated
the security exchanges. In general a familiar method of compelling
the disclosure of information to prospective investors has been resorted
to in the new act, in the requirement that certain securities be registered
and qualified. The securities covered by the act may be said, at this
preliminary stage, to be those involved in the usual types of corporate
financing through the use of trust deeds to secure notes, bonds, etc.
A novel type of protection has been provided by the Trust Indenture
Act, however, in the requirement of disclosure of facts regarding the
relation of the trustee, under the trust indenture, to the obligor, and by
the imposition of duties and the prohibition of exemptions of the trustee
from liabilities, rather than as in the previous legislation above referred to, by requiring disclosure of information regarding the obligor
or issuer of the securities.
It is widely known that the experience during the early depression
years following 1929 with various kinds of trust indenture securities
has been an unhappy and often a disastrous one; and that the difficulties
of scattered and unorganized security holders have been considerably
added to because of conflicts of interest on the part of the trustees who
in these situations have often times occupied not only a dual- but a
several-sided relationship to the issues secured by the indentures under
which they were trustees. For example, it was not impossible to find
situations where the trustee largely constituted or controlled the obligor,
was trustee under the indenture, was itself a holder of more or less of
the securities issued, was interested in or controlled other holders, and
was interested in or controlled the so-called protective committees
that were formed when default occurred and liquidation or reorganization was undertaken. Too often no one had much of a voice in such
liquidation or reorganization except the trustee; and too often the
interests, direct or indirect, of such trustee were opposed to those of
1 Aug. 3, 1939, c. 411, 53 Stat. 1149, 15 U.S.C.A. §77aaa et seq.
2 May 27, 1933, c. 38, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C.A. §77a et seq.
3 June 6, 1934, c. 404, 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C.A. §78a et seq.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

all who in theory, if not in fact, were supposed to be the beneficiaries
of the trust.
Aside from the matter df conflicts of interest between the trustee
and the beneficiaries, there were also other difficulties. One of the
important ones was that it was often impossible for security holders
to get information through either the trustee or the issuer as to the
identity of other security holders, in order that concerted action by
such security holders could be taken. Another difficulty was that under
the theory of freedom of contract, obligors were allowed both to exempt
the trustee from what might ordinarily be considered some of the most
important of trust duties and obligations, so that the trustee was usually
only a little, if at all, obligated to take action in behalf of the security
holder-beneficiaries, particularly in the event of default; and other provisions often made it next to impossible for the individual security
holders to act for their own protection.
The liquidation and reorganization work following depression defaults brought it forcefully to public attention that regardless of the
theory that issuers, trustees and security holders dealt at arms'
length so that each should look out for itself, in practice the investing
public had the idea that a trust indenture was an effective security
device from the point of view of the investor, and that the trustee was
in fact a trustee for them. This conflict between legal theory and investment practice resulted, among other things, in various investigations ;4
and the outcome was congressional resolution of the conflict, largely by
accepting the investor's point of view, and rejecting the freedom of
contract principle, operation under which had led to the practice of
so drawing trust security instruments and of so limiting the powers
and duties of trustees and of so limiting the effective rights of investors,
that, in the opinion of many, freedom had been turned into abuse.
It is not intended herein to review in any detail the requirements of
registration of securities generally, or of securities under trust indentures in particular, but rather to confine the discussion to requirements
as to disclosure of relationships between the trustee and the obligor,
and as to requirements in the way of affirmative duties imposed upon
trustees, and to prohibitions against resort to previous practices. Accordingly, with regard to the kinds of securities coming under the Trust
Indenture Act of 1939, it will only be said, generally and without strict
accuracy as to matters of detail, that such securities are those in the
form of "a note, bond, debenture, or evidence of indebtedness, whether
or not secured," ' 5 or a certificate of interest or participation in such note,
bond, etc., or a temporary certificate for or a guaranty of such note,
s
bond, etc., when the amount of the securities is over $1,000,000. There
4 Note the reference in the act itself to the reports to Congress of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, 15 U.S.C.A. §77bbb.
5 Ibid., §77ddd(a) (1).
6 See ibid., §77ddd(a) (9) for matters of detail regarding the amount of the
issue.
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are a number of other exemptions from the operation of the act, as for
example, securities exempt from the provisions of the Securities Act
of 1933. 7 However, the general situation is at least indicated by the
requirements that the issue by one in the form of notes, bonds, etc.,
secured by a trust deed or mortgage, and that the amount of the issue
be $1,000,000 or over.
It might be said in passing, that while the issues must be larger
than those likely to be offered in the smaller communities, and so from
the point of view of the practising lawyer, perhaps, a matter of no
great interest insofar as his practice is concerned with the issue of
securities in such communities, still the law is important in any community because of the protections it affords to investors, for they may
be found anywhere. In the main, however, the law will be of principal
original concern to those involved in the issuance of such securities,
either on behalf of the obligor or the trustee, for, generally speaking,
the steps taken to prevent use of former practices involve the denial
of registration of securities when the provisions of the law in regard to
their issue are not complied with, rather than remedial relief after an
issue has been improperly marketed and the harm, if any, is done.
This is illustrated by the provisions, frequently found in the act, that
"the indenture to be qualified shall require" certain things to be done, 8
or that "if the indenture to be qualified" is to require or permit certain
things, "such indenture shall contain provisions. . .. "9 In other words,
considerable reliance is placed on preventing the marketing of the issue,
in the beginning, if the law is not complied with.
Eligibility of Trustee
There are certain initial restraints or limitations upon trustees
under such indentures, and eligibility requirements are set out in the
act. 10 In the usual way of providing what the indenture to be qualified
shall contain, rather than by stating directly eligibility requirements,
the act provides that the indenture shall provide that at least one of
the trustees be "a corporation organized and doing business under the
laws of the United States, or of any state or territory or of the District
of Columbia . . . which (A) is authorized under such laws to exercise
corporate trust powers, and (B) is subject to supervision or examination
by Federal, State, Territorial or District of Columbia authority." This
trustee is called an "institutional trustee."
Subdivision 2 of the same section provides that the indenture to
be qualified shall require that the institutional trustee shall have as a
minimum a combined capital and surplus of not less than $150,000.
Provision is made in subdivision 3 for the appointment of one or more
7

See ibid., §77ddd(a)(4).

8 E.g., ibid., §77jjj(a) (1).

9 E.g., ibid., §77nnn(d).
10 Ibid., §77jjj.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

cotrustees with the institutional trustee, but if the indenture requires
or permits that, it is also required to provide, in substance, that such
cotrustees shall be burdened with the same obligations and responsibilities as the institutional trustee. It is further required that such additional trustees shall act in any jurisdictions where the institutional
trustee may not be qualified to do particular acts.
Disqualification of Trustee
In subdivision (b) of section 77jjj are found many of the most
important safeguards provided for investors by way of prohibition of too
close a relationship between the obligor and the trustee, and by way
of requirements of disclosure of such relationships and common interests.
The indenture cannot be qualified unless it provides that if a trustee
has or acquires any conflicting interest, as defined in the act, such
trustee shall within ninety days either "eliminate such conflicting interest or resign." A duty is also imposed upon the obligor to take "prompt
steps" to have a successor trustee appointed. This latter provision
obviously places the duty to take the initiative in providing a successor
trustee where it properly belongs, for otherwise, due to the lack of
means or of interest, or of ability to act in concert, a forbidden situation
might last indefinitely if the security holders were left to look out for
themselves in the matter of appointing promptly the required successor
trustee. But as an alternative, provision is also made whereby the
security holders, through a suit by one on behalf of all, may take the
initiative in the matter of securing the removal of the disqualified trustee
and the appointment of a successor. This alternative will probably be
of some practical importance, for the disqualified trustee is to be required, within ten days after the above mentioned ninety-day period
after it learns of the grounds for disqualification, to give notice to the
security holders of its failure either to eliminate the conflicting interest
or to resign. This burden of disclosure, of course, is important, for the
effect is that the security holders must be advised of the existence of
facts which may lead them to take action.
Conflicting Interests
Detailed and far reaching provisions are contained in the definition
in the act of what is a disqualifying conflicting interest on the part of
the indenture trustee." With certain exceptions, there is a conflict of
interest as defined by the act if the indenture trustee is "trustee under
another indenture under which any other securities, or certificates of
interest or participation in any other securities, of an obligor upon the
indenture securities are outstanding." In some of the excepted or exceptable cases, the matter is left to the 'Securities and Exchange Commis11 Ibid., §77jjj (b) (1) et seq.
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sion to determine whether or not there is such a conflict of interest as is
material and sufficient to disqualify the trustee.
The trustee is absolutely prohibited, however, from occupying
directly a dual role as trustee and obligor, for it is provided that an
indenture trustee shall be deemed to have a conflicting interest if "such
trustee or any of its directors or executive officers is an obligor upon
the indenture securities." A similar conflict of interest is deemed to
exist if the trustee or any of its directors or executive officers is an
underwriter for such obligor. The purpose of such prohibition of these
two kinds of dual interests should be obvious.
Much more far-reaching prohibitions also exist. In addition to the
prohibition of a conflict of interest in cases where the "trustee directly
or indirectly controls or is directly or indirectly controlled by or is
under direct or indirect common control" with an obligor or underwriter for such obligor, there are also safeguards against other less
direct and obvious instances of inter-relation of control and interest.
It may be sufficiently suggestive of the nature of these prohibitions,
without reviewing them in detail, to call attention to the fact that there
is deemed to be a disqualifying conflict of interest if as small a percentage as 10 per cent of the voting control in the indenture trustee is held
by the obligor, or an underwriter for such obligor, or by any director,
partner or executive officer of either. Circumvention of this provision,
through acquisition of less than 10 per cent each, by a number of such
directors, etc., of the voting control over the trustee is prohibited by
setting a total limit of such acquisitions or holdings below 20 per cent.
When the trustee, on the other hand, holds obligations of the obligor
constituting 5 per cent of the voting control or 10 per cent of any other
class of security, where there is a default the same disqualifying conflict of interest is deemed to occur. In general, it may be said that the
provisions against hidden control, identity of interest and like matters
are both comprehensive and adequate to serve the end of preventing the
trustee, either directly or indirectly, from having a substantial interest
in the obligor, or being subject in a substantial degree to the control,
direct or indirect of the obligor, or of those who have identical or similar
interests to those of the obligor. And while larger holdings of the indenture securities are permitted to the trustee when they are held nonbeneficially, as when they are held in other fiduciary capacities under
guardianships, trusts, executorships, etc., in which cases it may be
supposed that the trustee will have no self interest to serve and so no
temptation to make improper use of such securities not held by it
beneficially, there are even safeguards against improper manipulation
of such nonbeneficially held holdings. The aggregate of such holdings
must not equal 25 per cent or more of the voting securities of the
obligor; and even then after a default has occurred for a specified time,
the trustee is deemed to hold such securities beneficially and to be
disqualified thereby, if it would have been disqualified had it in fact
held them in title or beneficially. Furthermore, the trustee is required.
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indirectly, through the requirement that the indenture to be qualified
shall so provide, to check its holdings of indenture securities each year,
so that there will hardly be any excuse for ignorance on the part of the
trustee as to what its holdings actually are, even in the case of nonbeneficially held securities.
And finally, it is worth noticing that the foregoing provisions as to
percentage of control "shall not be construed as indicating that the
ownership of such percentages . . . is or is not necessary or sufficient to
constitute direct or indirect control" in certain cases. In other words,
while the mere holding of certain small percentages is not deemed to
result in a conflict of interest in and of itself, such as will disqualify
the indenture trustee, it seems that the matter may be examined into
as a matter of fact in particular cases, and the inference is that even
those small percentages of control not in themselves deemed to involve
a conflict of interest, may be prohibited because in fact they may be
sufficient to provide control. It might be suggested that the familiar
holding company pyramiding, to secure by small holdings at the top
substantial control of corporations several layers down, seems to be
safeguarded against.
Preferential Collection of Claims
A matter of some difficulty is involved when a trustee individually
competes with its beneficiary in the collection of claims against a common obligor. The problem has been before the courts, for example, in
cases where the trustee has kept for itself part of a larger purchase of
a security and has disposed of the rest to various trust portfolios. When
the obligor is in failing circumstances, there is an inevitable conflict of
interest between the trustee as such and as an individual in the effort
to realize what may be possible from the obligor. As an original proposition it would seem that the duty of fidelity should not bar a trustee
from investing in the same issue in which the trust funds are invested.
On the other hand, when collection or liquidation is involved, it seems
that the trustee at that stage should not be allowed to put its own individual interests completely ahead of those of its beneficiaries, and at
the same time those of the beneficiaries should not be so predominant
as to require a trustee to take a complete personal loss if there is not
enough to satisfy the claims of the beneficiary and of the trustee too. A
rule permitting and requiring a prorating of the amounts recovered
would seem to do substantial justice to all interests.
The same problem can arise when an indenture trustee holds part
of the indenture securities. The act 12 contains detailed and elaborate
provisions for prorating in these cases. In general, the trust deed is to
provide that if the trustee becomes a creditor of the obligor, etc., within
four months of default, a special account must be set up to which the
12 Ibid., 177kkk.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

trustee must allocate collections made or other reductions affected in
the trust deed indebtedness (except by the trustee's right of set off in
certain cases). There are exceptions, as when the reduction in indebtedness results from collection from others than the obligor, and when the
trustee without reasonable cause to believe that a default was likely to
occur took a security for its own individual claims. Avoidance of these
provisions by resignation on the part of the trustee is not permitted. It
is permissible, however, for the indenture to be qualified to except from
the proration requirements advances authorized in receivership or bankruptcy proceedings, and to pay off tax liens and otherwise to protect the
security, provided that notice of such advances be given as provided in
"proper" exceptions may be provided for
the indenture. Other so-called
13
in the trust instrument.
Bondholders Lists
One of the sorest spots in the liquidation and reorganization history
of recent years, has been the obstacle to co-operative effort on the part
of security holders furnished by their inability to locate each other.
Neither the obligor nor the indenture trustee was, as a rule, considered
to have any duty to disclose information as to who the other holders of
an issue were, although in the field of general trust law the trustee has
a broad and substantial duty to disclose information relevant to the trust
estate to the beneficiary. The consequence in the trust indenture field
was that "insiders," namely the obligor and trustee, and in aggravated
cases, the obligor-trustee, were able to control pretty much as they
desired the course of liquidation or of reorganization. The use of the
so-called "protective committee," often became what has been called a
"racket," and was not infrequently used to protect the obligor or the
trustee or both, rather than the purported objects of solicitude, the
holders of the defaulted issues.
The act 14 has provided substantial protection against the evils to
security holders due to retention of information as to bondholders or
other security holders for the exclusive use of the obligor, the trustee or
their dominated protective committees. The obligor is to be required by
the indenture to give full and complete information to the trustee regarding the holdings of the issue, and the trustee is to be required to preserve such information. The burden is therefore placed upon both of
those who are in a position to supply, preserve, and disclose information,
to compile and preserve such information as to who the security holders
are.
There is not, however, a complete and unqualified duty upon the
part of the trustee to disclose the names of security holders, even to
other bona fide holders of part of the same issue. Rather, an alternative
is required to be provided for in the indenture to be qualified, whereby
18 Ibid., §77kkk(b).
14 Ibid., §77111.
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on application of three or more security holders, they shall be allowed
access to the information held by the trustee in order to facilitate communication by such three with other holders of the issue; but if the
trustee elects not to allow such access, the trustee must forward the
communication to the other holders of the issue. This would seem to
afford a reasonably adequate opportunity for those interested in instituting co-operative measures, to reach others who might be interested
in such measures. It may be presumed that if the matter communicated
about is meritorious, responses will be received which will make it
possible for security holders to form, for example, their own protective
committees. If on the other hand the matter is not meritorious, the lack
of response to the communication may leave the three applicants in a
situation where they can cause no further trouble. And meanwhile the
failure of the trustee to disclose the desired information will result in a
denial to them of ammunition that might be used improperly for mere
trouble making, or for the purpose of bringing in others through various
high-pressure tactics, solicitation, or even fraud and coercion.
Provision is also made for the case where the trustee may feel that
the position of the applicants for information is so unmeritorious that
they should be denied both of the above mentioned opportunities. In that
case the trustee may refuse to act on either alternative, but must
promptly present to the Securities and Exchange Commission the matter
of the propriety of its action for the determination of the commission.
Reports by Trustees
Elaborate provision is made for the periodic and recurrent disclosure
by the trustee to the holders of the issue, of matters arising subsequent
to the original issue which may be considered material to the security
holders, regarding the continued eligibility of the trustee to act as such,
its claims and advances if any to the obligor, and particularly its holdings in its individual capacity of the indenture securities, together with
any security it may have therefor. There must be disclosure, under the
provisions of the indenture, if it is to be qualified, of other matters as
well, such as those relating to the release and substitution of properties
and securities subject to the indenture lien, and as to action taken by
the trustee in the performance of its duties. There is, therefore, provision
for a constant letting-in of the light of day upon transactions which under
former practice were often regarded as the special and peculiar concern of trustee and obligor, rather than of the trust beneficiaries.
These requirements in regard to what
the trustee to do are supplemented by
indenture shall impose upon the obligor,
mation to be transmitted to the trustee. 15
15 Ibid., §77nnn.

the trust indenture shall require
other requirements which the
in the way of reports of inforInformation to be filed with the
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trustee includes annual reports by the obligor and other information
required to be filed with the commission. The commission is also given
authority to prescribe by rule the disclosure of other information. Such
reports should enable security holders to keep in touch with the financial
condition of their obligors, and of the resulting or corresponding value
of their securities; and they likewise serve to provide the trustee with
information needed if it is effectively to perform its trust duties. Other
provisions require the obligor to report what it has done in the way of
meeting its own obligations under the trust indenture, so that all concerned may readily know if default in any undertaking has occurred
and the nature and extent thereof. In proper cases such reports of the
obligor must be supported by or supplemented by reports of accountants,
engineers or appraisers, and in some instances by opinions of counsel.
In the main, those familiar with the disclosure provisions of the Securities Act of 193316 will find about the same provisions here as are to be
found in that act, together with substantially similar safeguards through
the requirement of such independent reports, appraisals and legal
opinions. Such reports are particularly required for the information of.
the trustee in connection, for example, with such matters as release of
liens on part of the secured property, substitution of securities, and so on.
It is also provided that the indenture to be qualified shall provide that
the trustee shall be entitled to rely upon such reports and legal opinions
when the facts contained in them bear on the performance of particular
duties by the trustee; and, while it is said that the trustee may "conclusively rely" on such reports, it is also provided that the trustee is not
absolved from the duty of examining the evidence reported to it to see
17
if it conforms to the requirements of the indenture.
Exculpatory Clauses
While in general, independently of statute, exculpatory clauses have
been given a narrow construction, so that the result in practice is not to
relieve the trustee from liability for breach of trust in many cases that
would seem to come within the provisions of such clauses, still they have
been given some effect to protect the trustee from the consequences of its
negligence. The act, however, seems to carry on the process of eroding
away the protection intended by such provisions even more than the
courts have done. In effect the act provides that the trust indenture to be
qualified shall not contain any provisions excusing the trustee for negligence; and it appears that the very limited immunity that may be given
the trustee from liability for "any error of judgment made in good faith
by a responsible officer or officers of such trustee" is itself limited by
the further requirement that such error of judgment be not in itself
negligent.' 8 It is provided, however, that the trustee may act in good faith
16 15 U.S.C.A. 77aa et seq.
17 15 U.S.C.A. 77ooo(a)(2).
18 See ibid., §77ooo(d) (2).
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without liability, in accordance with the directions of the holders of the
majority in principal amount of the indenture securities, in certain
instances. 19
Suits and Proceedings by Trustee
It has been said regarding former practice in the security field,
that the ideal arrangement from the point of view of the obligor is to
have a security instrument that will sell, but one that will not be enforceable. The act departs from this "ideal" in providing that the indenture to be qualified must provide for authority in the trustee in case
of certain defaults, including default in the payment of principal (but
not necessarily in the case of an interest default) to recover judgment
in its own name as trustee of an express trust, against the obligor.
Similar provisions must be inserted in the instrument allowing the trustee
to file proofs of claim in order to have claims allowed against the obligor
in any judicial proceedings. 20 It is also provided that the indenture must
provide that in case of default the trustee must exercise such of the
rights and powers vested in it by the indenture and, in their exercise,
21
use the care and skill which would be used by a reasonable man.
Summary
It would appear that the Trust Indenture Act is a logical and necessary development of the policy first made effective by the Securities Act
of 1933, that the investor should have at least an opportunity to learn
what it is that he is buying. For although disclosure by the obligor at the
time of the offering of the security, and even at times subsequent thereto,
of information relating to the nature of the business, its history, and its
financial condition was an important step in the protection of the investor,
it did not go far enough. The act under discussion makes numerous and
important provisions for protection of another kind, by reaching the person who in the last analysis was often in the most important and strategic
position of all concerned in a security transaction, namely the trustee.
The liquidation and reorganization experience of the last ten years speaks
eloquently of the need for recognizing and regulating the activities of the
trustee as the "key man" in many of the critical or at least important
situations that develop from the time of the original offering until the
payment thereof or until the liquidation or reorganization of the obligor.
Cuas. H. KINNANE

22

19 Ibid., §77ooo(d)(3). See also for majority direction and control, §77ppp.
Three-fourths control is required in one instance by subdivision (a)(2). Without
discussing these provisions in detail, it should be noticed that control by less

than all is provided for only in particular instances.
20 Ibid., §77qqq.
21

Ibid., 177ooo(c).

22 Professor of Law, DePaul University.

